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T IS COMMON , EVEN
MUNDANE. TO OBSERVE
THAT THE SUPREME
COURTS APPROACH TO
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY
"TEXTUAUST' !N CHARACTER THAT IS , MORE ORIENTED TO
STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND THE
ASSERTEDLY "OBJECTIVE" MEANING
OF STATUTORY TEXT THAN TO THE
COLLECTIVE SUBJECTIVE INTENT
BEHIND THE LEGISLATION .
BECAUSE COMMITTEE REPORTS .
FLOOR STATEMENTS AND OTHER
MATERIALS GENERATED DURING
THE LEG!SLATIVE PROCESS
TRADITIONALLY APPEAR IN
STATUTORY [NTERPRETATION
OPlNIONS AS EVIDENCE OF THE
CONTROLLING LEGISLATIVE
lNTENT, THE COURTS DECLINING
USE OF THESE MATERIALS IN
CONSTRUING AMBIGUOUS
STATUTORY PROVlSlONS HAS
GENERALLY BEEN TAKEN TO
SIGNAL A MOVE AWAY FROM
"lNTENTlONALISM" AND TOWARD
THE "NEW TEXTUALlSM"
ASSOCIATED MOST PROMINENTLY
WITH JUSTICE ANTONIN CALIA
lN THIS PAPER. I PURSUE WHAT
1 THINK OF AS EMPIRICALLY
INFORMED NORMATIVE ANALYSI .
MY POINT OF DEPARTURE IS THE
45 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
DECISIONS IN THE OCTOBER 199
TERM OF THE UPREME COURT AS
IN PRE IOUS EMPIRICAL TUDlE
BY PROFES OR THOMAS MERRILL
AND JUDGE PATRICIA WALD. I USE
THE STATUTORY lNTERPRETATlON
OPlNlONS IN A RECENT SUPREME
COURT TERM TO A E THE
E TENT TO WHICH LEGI LATIVE
HI TORY CONTINUE TO FIGURE
PROMINENTLY lN THE COURT
lNTERPRETIVE APPROACH . UNLIKE
THESE OTHERANALY E ,
HOWEVER 1 AL
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BY )ANE S. SCHACTER
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T IS COMMON . EVEN
MUNDANE. TO OBSERVE
THAT THE SUPREME
COURTS APPROACH TO
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY
'TEXTUALIST" IN CHARACTER THAT IS. MORE ORIENTED TO
STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND THE
ASSERTEDLY "OBJECTIVE" MEANING
OF STATUTORY TEXt THAN TO THE
COLLECTIVE SUBJECTIVE INTENT
BEHIND THE LEGISLATION .
BECAUSE COMMITTEE REPORTS.
FLOOR STATEMENTS AND OTHER
MATERIALS GENERATED DURING
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
TRADITIONALLY APPEAR IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
OPINIONS AS EVIDENCE OF THE
CONTROLLING LEGISLATIVE
INTENT. THE COURTS DECLINING
USE OF THESE MATERIALS IN
CONSTRUING AMBIGUOUS
STATUTORY PROVISIONS HAS
GENERALLY BEEN TAKEN TO
SIGNAL A MOVE AWAY FROM
"INTENTIONALISM" AND TOWARD
THE "NEW TEXTUALISM"
ASSOCIATED MOST PROMINENTLY
WITH JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA.
IN TH IS PAPER. I PURSUE WHAT
I THINK OF AS EMPIRICALLY
INFORMED NORMATIVE ANALYSIS.
MY POINT OF DEPARTURE IS THE
45 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
DECISIONS IN THE OCTOBER 1996
TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT. AS
IN PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES
BY PROFESSOR THOMAS MERRI LL
AND JUDGE PATRICIA WALD. I USE
THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
OPINIONS IN A RECENT SUPREME
COURT TERM TO ASSESS THE
EXTENT TO WHICH LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY CONTINUES TO FIGURE
PROMINENTLY IN THE COURTS
INTERPRETIVE APPROACH . UNLIKE
THESE OTHER ANALYSES.
HOWEVER. I ALSO USE THE CASES
TO ANALYZE THE EXTENT TO
WHICH THE COURT USES A
BROAD RANGE OF OTHER
INTERPRETIVE RESOURCES IN
THESE OPINIONS.
IN THE END. I DRAW THREE
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS.

I

The following excerpt is reprinted with
permission of Stanford Law Review, 559 Natlian
Abbott Way, Palo Alto, CA 94035. "The
Con{ounding Common Law Originalism in Recent
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation:
Implications for the Legislative History Debate
and Beyond, " (excerpt including tables),
Jane Schacter, Vol. 50, No. 1, 1998. Reproduced
by permission of the publisher via Copyright
Clearance Center, Inc. A complete and annotated
version may be obtained from the author or
Law Quadrangle Notes.
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First, when measured against other
empirical analyses, the 1996 term reflects
some resurgence in the use of legislative
history and an apparent decline in another
benchmark of the "new textualism" citations to the dictionary.
Second, and more interesting, there are
significant features in the court's
interpretive jurisprudence that confound
the interpretive divides that structure so
much contemporary scholarship. It is
standard, for example, to distinguish
among different forms of originalism in
statutory construction, and to draw an
important line between "textualism" on the
one hand, and "intentionalism" or
"purposivism" on the other. Similarly, in his
recent book, A Matter of Interpretation
(1997),Justice .Scalia set textualism, his
preferred brand of originalism, against its
asserted opposite - the common law
mode . My analysis of the recent opinions
suggests that these categories are far too
stylized to capture the court's interpretive
practices which , in fact , cut across these
familiar categories. I argue that the idea of
"common law originalism" better describes
the approach taken in the court's recent
opinions, and that it describes equally well
cases that do and do not cite legislative
history.
Third, when situated with the empirical
context created by the study, the critique of
legislative history does not fare well. Given
what common law originalism entails, and
what the justices are regularly doing in
statutory interpretation cases, it is difficult
to sustain the basic premises of the attack
on legislative history. Moreover, if the
common law originalism that I find
characteristic of the term's cases has staying
power, it will have significant implications
for statutory interpretation more generally
Shifting the focus in this way suggests that
the use of legislative history and other
interpretive resources should be assessed
not for their capacity to reveal accurately a
singularly correct original meaning, but
instead for their ability to advance the
more eclectic, policy-oriented process of
assigning meaning to ambiguous legislative
directives.
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THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DEBATE

The challenge to legislative history as a
legitimate interpretive resource for judges is
part of a larger challenge to the search for
legislative intent that has traditionally
framed judicial interpretation of statutes.
On the traditional "intentionalist" account,
language is the best evidence of the
legislative intent underlying a statute, but
judges may legitimately consult materials
like committee reports or floor statements
in the search for intent where the language
is ambiguous. But if intent is the wrong
benchmark - as, for example, Justice
Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook have
argued - then the relevance of legislative
history is far less certain. In a line of
opinions written in the 1980s and early
1990s, Scalia took aim squarely at the
concept of legislative intent, arguing that it
is not the court's function "to enter the
minds of the members of Congress - who
need have nothing in mind in order for
their votes to be both lawful and effective
- but rather to give fair and reasonable
meaning to the text of the United States
Code, adopted by various Congresses at
various times."
More recently, Justice Scalia seems to
have forsaken his campaign to banish the
concept of legislative intent from the
judicial vocabulary, perhaps recognizing
that intent is too entrenched an interpretive
idiom to dislodge. In A Matter of
Interpretation, he sought to reappropriate
intent and recast its meaning in expressly
textualist terms: "[W]e do not really look
for subjective legislative intent. We look for
a sort of 'objectified' intent - the intent
that a reasonable person would gather from
the text of the law, placed alongside the
remainder of the corpus juris ."
The essential propositions in play in the
legislative history debate can be
summarized briefly
1. The judicial critique of legislative
history: undermining the court's
institutional role. The central point here is
that judicial use of legislative history
enables and perhaps encourages judicial
activism . The late Judge Harold Leventhal
of the D.C. Circuit analogized judicial use
of legislative history to entering a cocktail
party and "looking over a crowd and

picking out your friends." More recently,
Justice Scalia has argued that the use of
legislative history "has facilitated rather
than deterred decisions that are based
upon the court's policy preferences, rather
than neutral principles of law." From
Justice Scalia's point of view, this quality of
legislative history is bound up with its role
in the traditional intent-based framework:
"[U]nder the guise or even the self-delusion
of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents,
common-law judges will in fact pursue
their own objectives and desires, extending
their lawmaking proclivities from the
common law to the statutory field. "
2. The legislative critique of legislative
history: undermining Congress'
institutional role. Critics have also charged
that judicial use of legislative history
distorts the proper role of Congress. There
are three principal claims. The first claim
- call it the "rogue law" point - is that
judicial use of legislative history
undermines important principles of
constitutional structure. When judges
credit legislative history, Justice Scalia
argues, they essentially elevate to the status
of "law" that which has not survived the
rigors of bicameralism and presentment
demanded by Article I.
The second claim - the "staffer/interest
group empowerment" point - centers on
the idea that committee reports, floor
speeches and the like are frequently written
by unelected legislative staffers who, in
turn, often work with lobbyists acting on
behalf of interest groups. Judicial
consultation of legislative history, the critics
argue, creates incentives and leverage for
both staffers and lobbyists to write into law
items that do not appear in the statutory
text because they fail to command the
support of a legislative majority
The third claim - the "disciplinarian"
point - is more frankly functional:
Legislators should learn the "discipline" to
write into statutory text that which they
intend to give the force of law.

OCTOBER 1996 TERM:

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

My findings are based upon an analysis
of all decisions in the 1996 term that
decide a question of statutory interpretation
involving federal law. If the courts opinion
included any substantial discussion of
statutory meaning, I included the case. Of
the 80 full opinions issued during the
term, 45 qualify as statutory interpretation
decisions. I analyzed all 45 majority
opinions. I also included 8 concurring and
26 dissenting opinions, producing a total
of 79 opinions. Of the 45 cases, 21 had at
least one dissent.
I included the following nine
interpretive resources in my analysis:
(l)The statutory language at issue in
the case;
(2)Legislative history (including
committee reports, statements and
other information in the
Congressional Record, or other
material generated in the legislative
process through which the law was
enacted);
(3)Other statutes (state or federal), or
other sections of the same statute at
issue in the case;
(4)Judicial opinions (including previous
decisions by the Supreme Court or
other federal or state courts);
(5)Canons of construction;
(6)Administrative materials (including
federal regulations or policy
statements, letters or advisory
opinions written by agency officials,
and agency adjudicatory decisions);
(?)Secondary sources (including law
review and newspaper articles,
treatises, other books, and policy
reports);
(8)Dictionaries (whether general
or legal);
(9)Miscellaneous other.
I also have identified and included in
the analysis an interpretive resource used
by the court with striking frequency in the
term's cases, but not established in the
study of statutory interpretation. I call this
category "judicially-selected policy norms."
These norms appear in different ways in
the cases but are unified by a defining
characteristic: they are nonoriginalist. They

reflect the justices' own invocation of
policy values that are grounded in neither
the text of the statute nor the legislative
history nor any other claim about intended
legislative design.

FINDINGS

1. Legislative history. To the extent that
the debate over legislative history reflects
an underlying debate about the use of
legislative intent as an interpretive
framework, the term's decisions suggest
that the textualists' challenge to "intent" as
an anchoring concept has yet to succeed.
The concept of "intent" is invoked in
53 percent (24/45) of the terms majority
opinions, and if we broaden the search to
include other words looking to
congressional design - such as references
to Congress' "will," "desire" or "purpose"
- the percentage increases to 84 percent
(38/45).
The court did use legislative history in
its 1996 term opinions more frequently
than Professor Thomas Merrill reported in
his study of the 1992 term. Whereas
Merrill found that 18 percent (12/66) of
the 1992 term's majority opinions included
a substantive citation to legislative history,
my data reflect that legislative history is
cited in about half (22/45) of the majority
opinions from the 1996 term.
Less frequent reference to the dictionary
in statutory interpretation cases may reflect
the declining fortunes of textualism, but
this evidence is more uncertain. Merrill
observed the increasing rate at which the
justices were consulting the dictionary in
statutory cases, and, not surprisingly,
linked these citations to the textualist
method of interpretation. During the 1996
term, however, the rate of dictionary
citations fell rather sharply from the most
recent numbers reported by Merrill. My
data reflect citations to the dictionary in
only 18 percent (8/45) of the majority
opinions, compared to the 33 percent
observed by Merrill.
It would be premature to declare the
trend against legislative history to have
reversed itself, although I have found no

LiEREARE
SIGNIFICANT FEATURES
IN THE COURT'S
INTERPRETIVE
JURISPRUDENCE THAT
CONFOUND THE
INTERPRETIVE DIVIDES
THAT STRUCTURE SO
MUCH CONTEMPORARY
SCHOLARSHIP. IT IS
STANDARD, FOR
EXAMPLE, TO
DISTINGUISH AMONG
DIFFERENT FORMS OF
ORIGINALISM IN
STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION, AND
TO DRAW AN
IMPORTANT LINE
BETWEEN
"TEXTUALISM" ON
THE ONE HAND,
AND
"INTENTIONALISM"
OR "PURPOSIVISM"
ON THE OTHER.
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particular reason to suspect that the 1996
term is an outlier. Continuing observation
will tell us whether the long-term trend is
running in favor of legislative history. At
the very least, the data from the 1996 term
do suggest that the "major transformation"
heralded by Merrill has not materialized.
2. Beyond legislative history: the
court's use of all interpretive resources.
To generate a more detailed and complete
picture of the courts interpretive practices,
and thus to have a richer context in which
to understand the legislative history, I
moved beyond the focus on legislative
history characteristic of the earlier
empirical studies by Merrill and Judge
Patricia Wald, and looked to the broader
range of interpretive resources used by the
justices. As Table 1 reflects, the court's
interpretive practices are quite eclectic.
A wide array of resources were used
regularly in the terms majority opinions.
The incidence of reliance on these
resources does not change materially when
the focus is broadened to include all
statutory opinions (majority, concurring
and dissenting) . The data from the
opinions further suggest that there are
significant common law dimensions to the
court's approach to statutory interpretation.
Indeed, the 1996 term's cases suggest that
the idea of "common law originalism"
better describes the courts approach to
statutory interpretation than do more
familiar conventional categories.
What is "common law originalism?" In
the terms opinions, statutory language is
plainly a dominant source, and the cases
reflect an originalism in the sense that
language supplies the critical interpretive
anchor. While statutory language is the
consistent point of departure, and there is,
thus, plainly an originalist component to
the courts approach, it is only a distinctly
diluted form of originalism that the court
seems to be practicing. As Table 1 reflects,
the justices regularly invoke a wide-ranging
set of judicially created devices to develop
and give meaning to the contested
statutory language. The judicial lineage of
these devices, and the significant discretion
they reserve for judges, leads me to
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TABLE 1
USE OF INTERPRETIVE RESOURCES
IN OPINIONS
Majority Opinions
(n::45)

All Opinions
(n=79)

Statutory Language

100%
(45/45)

100%
(79n9)

Precedent

100%
(45/45)

95%
(75n9)

Other Statutes or Other Sections
of the Same Statute

87%
(39/45)

77%
(61n9)

Judicially-Selected Policy Norms

73%
(33/45)

73%
(5sn9)

Canons of Construction

56%
(25/45)

48%
(3&n9)

Secondary Sources
(Treatises, Articles,
Policy Reports, Etc.)

51%
(23/45)

46%
(3&n9)

Administrative Materials

49%
(22/45)

46%
(3&n9)

Legislative History

49%
(22/45)

46%
(3&n9)

Miscellaneous Other

31%
(14/45)

28%
(22n9)

Dictionary

18%
(8/45)

12%
(1Dn9)

conclude that the courts interpretive
originalism is mediated by a strong dose of
common law methodology - hence my
term "common law originalism."
In tracing the contours of the common
law originalism that emerges in the terms
statutory opinions, I reach five central
conclusions about the court's interpretive
practices.
A. Prevalence of judicially selected
policy norms. Most striking in my
examination of the opinions is the
extensive use of judicially selected policy
norms. These norms have not attracted

focused scholarly notice or attention, but
were used in 73 percent of all the majority
opinions and 73 percent of all opinions
combined (majority, dissenting and
concurring).
These policy norms principally appear
in the cases in two recurring - and
sometimes overlapping - forms. First,
several opinions in the data set argue that
desirable or adverse policy consequences
are likely to flow from a particular reading
of the statute, but do not explicitly link
those consequences to the legislative
language of design. There is a strong flavor

of unabashed Posnerian consequentialism
to these arguments. This kind of norm
appears when an opinion asserts that
reading a statute in a particular way would
undermine specified values not found in
the statute, and should be rejected on this
basis. For example, in Walters v. Metropolitan
Educational Enterprises, Inc. (117 S. Ct. 660
[1997]), the question was whether an
employer had sufficient employees to be
covered by Title VII. Justice Scalia's
majority opinion held that a payroll-based
method of counting employees was a "fair
reading" of the language in Title VII
looking to the number of employees an
employer "has" at a given time, and went
on to argue that an alternative
interpretation proposed by the employer
should be rejected because it would require
a complex and expensive factual inquiry
The use of systemic norms like these in
majority opinions is frequently met in
dissenting opinions with the use of a
counter-systemic norm, one that is
deployed in service of the opposite result.
For example, Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor (117 St. Ct. 2231 [1997]) posed
the question whether Federal Rule 23 of
Civil Procedure should be read to authorize
class certification for purposes of settling all
present and future asbestos-related claims.
Justice Ginsburg argued that reading the
rule to do so would undermine
congressional primacy to create a claimsprocessing system for asbestos injuries.
Against this institutional policy norm,
Justice Breyer in dissent argued that the
strong practical need for such a procedure
should lead the court to permit certification
under Rule 23.
Some opinions reflect a second, slightly
different use of judicially-selected policy
norms: as value-laden interpretive baselines
against which the meaning of the disputed
language is measured and assessed. Several
opinions, for example, assert that particular
policy consequences would flow from one
reading of the legislation, and then argue
on this basis that no intent to bring about
these consequences should be imputed to
Congress. In Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v.
Rambo (117 S. Ct. 1953 [1997]), for
example, the question was whether a

worker who is disabled under the
Longshore Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act (LHWCA) may obtain compensation
when his post-injury earnings exceed his
pre-injury earnings, but when there is also
a likelihood that his future earning capacity
will be diminished. Justice Souters majority
opinion chronicled the practical problems
associated with delaying all claims under
the LHWCA until a workers loss of earning
capacity manifested itself, and concluded
that those consequences made it unlikely
that Congress intended to defer such
claims.
This rhetorical device supplies a
substantive baseline in much the same way
that use of a normatively charged canon,
presumption, or clear statement rule does.
But in the cases I studied, policy norms do
not appear as general rules or default
principles. They are better understood as a
kind of ad hoc, judicial policymaking one that gives judges a substantial role in
policy selection and analysis.
Let me add another point that can help
place in context the prevalence of judicially
selected policy norms in the opinions
studied. Ten of the 45 cases studied
construe statutes that contain enacted
sections that declare the "policy" concerns,
"purposes," and/or "findings" underlying
the statutes. Unlike legislative history, these
sections are voted on by the full chambers
of Congress and written into law. Yet,
despite the frequent resort in the opinions
studied to judicially-selected policy norms
to help resolve statutory ambiguity, it is
notable that only one opinion in the study
invoked one of these enacted "policy,
purpose of finding" sections.
A related finding that underscores the
role of judicial policymaking in the process
of construing language is the frequency
with which secondary sources are invoked.
Roughly half of the majority opinions cite
secondary sources, such as law review
articles, books, treatises, policy reports or
other similar materials. These are not
created by judges, but they are also not
originalist. They are frequently used
components in the enterprise of judicial
policymaking. For example, in Atherton v.
FDIC (117 S. Ct. 666 (1997)], Justice
Breyer rejected a litigants argument that
there should be a uniform federal standard

of liability for bank officers and directors
under a federal statute, and found support
in a statistical analysis of the banking
industry suggesting that there were other
obstacles to uniformity
B. Frequent resort to precedent. The
consistent use of the court's own precedent
reflects a second common law dimension
in the terms cases. Judicial opinions rank
with statutory language as the most
frequently cited resources. Indeed, the
court often relies heavily on its own
statutory decisions in construing federal
legislation.
The regular use of prior opinions should
not be surprising, given that some
observers have argued for an exceptionally
strong rule of stare decisis in the realm of
statutory interpretation. Notably, however,
in the cases I studied that had a dissent,
the majority and dissent frequently differ
on the effect or meaning of prior case law.
In 62 percent of the cases with a dissent
(13/21), the majority and dissent disagree
about how or whether a prior decision
applies. To a significant extent, the justices
thus find themselves having to interpret the
text not only of congressional legislation,
but of their own opinions, and frequently
the meaning of the court's own words is
disputed by opposing justices.
C. Frequent use of canons of
construction. Fifty-six percent of all
majority opinions (25/45) cite at least one
canon of construction. Canons are
judicially created, are both numerous and
diverse, and are often shaped by
substantive policy norms. Their usage thus
reveals another facet of the common law
style in the cases studied. The claim that
canons of construction give the statutory
interpreters who invoke them considerable
discretion is, of course, not a new one. Karl
Llewellyns famous article ("Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decisions and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are
to Be Construed," 3 Vanderbilt Law Review
395, 396 [1950]) showing that, for many
canons, there is a corresponding canon that
can, with equal plausibility, be invoked in
the same case, long ago undermined any
characterization of canons as innocuous or
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neutral interpretive aids. And while some,
including Justice Scalia, have taken issue
with parts of llewellyns account, one
might find in the terms cases some signs of
modem-day llewellynism: In 8 of the 21
cases with a dissent, the majority and
dissent either invoked different canons to
resolve statutory ambiguity or disagreed
about how to apply the same canon.
D. Anti-common law? The frequent
use of "other statutes" and "administrative materials." Table 1 (page 76)
reflects regular usage of interpretive
resources not generated by the court, but
instead by Congress or agencies. In
particular, fully 87 percent of majority
opinions look to "other statutes or other
sections of the ?ame statute," and 49
percent of majority opinions look to
"administrative materials." This pattern of
consulting legislative- and administrativelycreated sources suggests that it would
plainly overstate the case to accuse the
court of using only interpretive resources of
its own creation (like those discussed
above), or of being engaged only in
common law type interpretation of
statutory language. But that is the case I
seek to make. The court has not cornered
the market on creation of interpretive
resources. The frequent use of materials
produced by other branches of government
is not inconsistent with either of my two
main points: First, the court makes
significant use of judicially generated
resources in its interpretive work, and
second, the manner in which the court
employs the resources it uses has notable
common law qualities.
As Table 1 notes, 39 of 45 majority
opinions use other federal or state statutes
or other sections of the same statute as an
interpretive resource. An explanation for
the use of separate federal and state statutes
as interpretive resources is the capacity of
the court to play an integrative function in
the larger lawmaking process by weaving
together and harmonizing different statutes
in order to yield a coherent body of
connected law. Indeed, most of the 39
majority opinions that cite to "other
statutes or other sections of the same
statute" - 32 out of 39 - include
citations to separate federal or state
statutes. Thus, while these interpretive
78
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resources are not judicially created, there is
some evidence that they are being used in a
common law style.
A similar point can be made about the
citations to administrative materials.
Interpretive resources generated by
agencies appear in a significant portion of
the options - 49 percent. This category
includes sources like agency regulations,
advisory opinions, rulings, correspondence
to Congress, and the like. In addition,
when one of the opinions studied
considers whether to defer to the view of
an agency about the meaning of the statute
under review in the case, consistent with
the principle of Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. (467 U.S.
83 7 [1984]), I include that within the
category of administrative materials. The
Chevron doctrine, a subject of extended
academic debate and study, holds that
when a statute administered by an
administrative agency is ambiguous, courts
should defer to the agencys reasonable
interpretation of the statute.
The Chevron doctrine makes only an
anemic appearance in the terms statutory
cases. Chevron is cited in five majority
opinions. Yet, at least one brief filed in 12
cases argued for Chevron deference.
Moreover, in only two of the terms five
cases citing to Chevron did the court
ultimately defer to an agency interpretation
of the statute under review. And, even in
those two cases, the court used several
other interpretive resources in reaching its
conclusion, including judicially selected
policy norms. Thus, the opinions reflect
infrequent use of the one administrative
resource - the Chevron doctrine - that
has the capacity (in theory at least) to
dislodge judicial discretion. Instead, the
justices much more frequently used other
kinds of administrative resources, ones that
do not purport to deprive the court of its
flexibility to use a range of other resources
- including judicially created ones - in
constructing statutory meaning.

E. Legislative history v. no legislative
history cases. The eclecticism and
common law originalism of the case set
holds across cases that cite legislative
history and those that do not. As noted
earlier, the majority opinions issued during
the 1996 term consult legislative history in
approximately half of all the cases. The vast
majority of the legislative history citations
in these opinions are to committee reports.
Notably, the profile of the majority
opinions consulting legislative history is
quite similar to the profile of the opinions
that do not cite legislative history: There are
signs of common law originalism in both
sets of cases. Many scholars assume that
interpretive questions are either/or - that
judges must choose, for example, between
canons or legislative history: But the terms
cases do not bear this out. As Table 2
(next page) shows, the two groups of
opinions tend to use other interpretive
resources - including judge-made ones at comparable rates.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY DEBATE AND BEYOND

If the data from the 1996 term are
predictive of future terms, it may be that
the critique of legislative history is losing
steam. But Justice Scalias recent book and
some of his comments on legislative history
in the term's opinions suggest that he, for
one, is not abandoning the cause. And, in
any event, even the data presented here
show the court consults legislative history
in only about half the cases in which
legislative history is cited to the court in a
brief. Thus, the basic debate over legislative
history seems to remain alive. I consider in
this section what implications flow from
the data I have presented.
1. Implications for the judicial critique
of legislative history. The central argument
of the judicial critique is that the use of
legislative history enables an undesirable
brand of "judicial activism" because the
volume and variability of a statutes
legislative history permits judges to make
selective, strategic use of that history while
professing to defer to Congress by
honoring its intent. The common law
originalism that characterizes the opinions

studied undermines this argument in
several ways.
First, my study illustrates that the
terrain of "judicial activism" ranges far
beyond legislative history. As Table 1
reflects, value-laden, judicially-created
interpretive resources are used regularly
Second, the similar profiles of the
legislative history and nonlegislative history
cases suggest that it is problematic to target
the use of legislative history for special
disapproval on judicial activism grounds.
The absence of legislative history hardly
translates into the presence of judicial
"restraint." Indeed, as Table 2 reflects, cases
that do and do not cite legislative history
are equally likely to use judicially-shaped
policy norms.
Third, given the prevalent usage of
judicially-selected policy norms in the
opinions studied, we might conclude that
the failure to consult legislative history is
actually the more activist move, for it gives
the judge more power to shape the policy
objectives of the statute unilaterally,
unconstrained by policy priorities or goals
that may have been expressed by
legislators. Moreover, a judicial decision to
categorically disregard legislative history is,
after all, a judicial decision about who
decides what is relevant to statutory
meaning, and is, in that sense, difficult to
reconcile with a strong conception of
judicial restraint.
2. Implications for the legislative
critique of legislative history. Recall that
the legislative critique of legislative history
is comprised of three main claims, each of
which relates to the legislative process: the
rogue law claim, the staffer/interest group
empowerment claim, and the disciplinarian
claim. Although this study does not
provide a basis for engaging every aspect of
the legislative critique, it does reveal some
significant problems in each of the three
claims that make up the legislative critique.

THE ROGUE LAW CLAIM. The claim
that legislative history should be ignored
because it was not approved by a majority
of both houses and by the president is
called into question in several ways by the
cases studied. First, the manner in which
legislative history is cited in the opinions
does not support the argument that the

TABLE 2
USE OF INTERPRETIVE RESOURCES
IN MAJORITY OP,INIONS
THAT USE AND DO NOT USE LEGISIATIVE HISTORY

All Opinions
Majority Opinions
Using Legislative Using Legislative
History (n=22)
History (n=23)
Precedent

100%
(22/22)

100%
(22/22)

Statutory Language

100%
(22/22)

100%
(22/22)

Other Statutes or Other Sections
of the Same Statute

77%
(17/22)

91%
(21/23)

Judicially-Selected Policy Norms

73%
(16/22)

74%
(17/23)

Canons of Construction

55%
(12/22)

57%
(13/23)

Secondary Sources

55%
(12/22)

48%
(11/23)

Administrative Materials

45%
(10/22}

52%
(12/23)

Miscellaneous Other

27%
(6/22)

36%
(8/22)

Dictionary

18%
(4/22)

17%
(4/23)

mere use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation elevates it to the status of
formal "law" requiring enactment under
Article I procedures. Second, if reliance
upon legislative history in a judicial
opinion amounts to lawmaking that is
illegitimate for lack of bicameralism and
presentment, then consultation of most of
the other interpretive resources used
widely in the cases studied - including
use of these resources in opinions that cite
no legislative history - presumably does
so as well. Indeed, the problem is perhaps
most readily apparent with respect to the
judicially-selected policy norms I have

emphasized, which might similarly be
characterized as illegitimate judicial law.
There is a deeper issue here that goes
more fundamentally to the idea of
bicameralism and presentment. Presumably;
taking a vote in both chambers and
requiring a presidential signature or
supermajority in its absence matter most,
at least in Madisonian terms, because
meaningful deliberation and representation
are the larger values that Article I's
procedures are calculated to promote. But
the tradition of committee powers, and the
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broader phenomenon of highly limited
participation observed by Richard Hall
(Participation in Congress, 1996), call into
question the extent to which the mere fact
of a vote in both chambers, on its own,
evidences robust - or even moderate dynamics of deliberation and representation.
The leading study of roll call voting in
Congress raises similar questions. The
portrait of voting decisions painted by John
Kingdon suggests that, in many instances,
legislators engage in a thin search for
informational shortcuts and proxies, rather
than study issues in detail or read much, if
anything, about the subject of the bill.
Indeed, the sheer mass of issues
confronting Congress necessarily reduces
the extent to which Congress can fully
deliberate over legislation, and it
undermines the idea that a legislative vote,
standing alone, signifies close deliberation
or broad, representation-enhancing
participation by members of each chamber.
These accounts are relevant to the rogue
law claim because they challenge the
underlying basis for drawing a strong
distinction between text (which is voted
upon by the body) and legislative history
(which is either voted upon by the
committee only, in the case of the reports,
or not at all, in the case of floor
statements).

THE STAFFER/INTEREST GROUP
EMPOWERMENT CLAIM. The
staffer/interest group empowerment claim
in particular implicates a range of issues
relating to the legislative process as to
which important empirical questions have
gone largely unaddressed by legislative
scholars. There are plenty of anecdotes
conjuring the image of late-night cabals
between committee aides and lobbyists,
but little systematic research about drafting.
For example, it would be relevant to study
to what extent, on what sorts of issues, and
with what degree of involvement by elected
representatives, staffers do , in fact, write
committee reports, floor speeches, and
other sources of legislative history. Do
staffers also routinely write the text of
statutes, as the sheer volume of legislative
work confronting elected representatives
might suggest? Similarly, what is the nature
and extent of lobbyist involvement in
80
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drafting? Recent anecdotal accounts suggest
that there are instances when lobbyists
write language that appears verbatim in
bills as statutory text, but no systematic
study has been done of the role of lobbyists
in drafting either language or legislative
history
Indeed, if the root problem with
legislative history is staff and lobbyist
empowerment, then we should consider
not only the role of staff and lobbyists in
producing the statutory language that is
favored by textualist theory, but also the
ways in which staffer and interest group
influences are part of the dynamics of the
adjudicative process.
There is an intriguing aspect of the cases
studied here that moves this abstract
proposition into a more concrete context.
The role of organized interests in Supreme
Court practice is perhaps most visible in
the filing of briefs amicus curiae. Some 204
amicus briefs were filed in the 45 cases
studied. In 41 of the 45 cases studied, at
least one brief amicus curiae was filed. In
most cases (33 of these 41), multiple
amicus briefs were filed, with briefs by
organized interests predominating. The
definition of an "organized interest" is
subject to debate, but if we exclude from
the total set of amicus briefs filed those
submitted on behalf of governmental
entities and law professors filing in their
own behalf on issues unrelated to legal
education, that leaves 173 of the 204
briefs, or 85 percent, filed by entities or
groups pressing a specific set of policy
interests - including bankers, builders,
asbestos manufacturers, hospitals, trial
lawyers, corporations, environmentalists,
and public interest organizations of various
kinds.
There is nothing inherently pernicious
about the filing of amicus briefs. Indeed,
one can argue that these briefs improve, or
even "democratize" interpretive litigation
by expanding the scope of perspectives
before the court. Particularly if we see
interpretive cases as presenting the court
with policy-sensitive choices in many cases,
there can be real functional advantages to
the filing of briefs by engaged and
informed interests - many of whom had

probably lobbied Congress
and any regulatory agency
involved in the statutory
scheme at an earlier point.
More generally, there is
nothing inherently
pernicious about the role of
interest groups in public
policy spheres. The problem
comes with the unequal
participation, access, and
resources that such groups
enjoy. Indeed, some familiar
collective action problems
seem to be in evidence in
the domain of Supreme
Court amicus practice, for unorganized,
dispersed interests do not frequently file
briefs with the court. The justices generally
hear from those with a strong stake, intense
preference, and sufficient resources to
justify the costs of participating in Supreme
Court litigation.
It is, of course, difficult to assess the
extent to which amicus briefs filed during
the 1996 term did, in fact, "influence" the
ultimate decisions reached by the court.
Amicus briefs are specially cited in 13
opinions and several of the briefs cited
were submitted on behalf of an organized
interest.
Two facts stand out:
(1) Many of the amicus briefs were filed
on behalf of politically engaged and
active interest groups that were , in
most cases, likely to have pressed
similar arguments before Congress
and, where applicable, administrative
agencies;
(2)The prevalence of judicially-selected
policy norms and other judge-made
interpretive resources suggest that
litigation over statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court can be a
worthwhile venture for interested
amici, one in which amicus briefs
may play a role by pressing a line of
policy-oriented argument.
Just as the Supreme Court is not
immune from interest group influence, it is
also not necessarily free from substantial
staffer influence. Members of the Supreme
Court are, like legislators, confronted with
a high workload that makes personal
handling of all tasks plainly unrealistic.

Justices use law clerks to assist in a wide
array of work. One parallel to legislative
history is particularly striking: While
legislative history is frequently drafted by
staffers and then signed by members,
Supreme Court opinions are often drafted
by law clerks and then signed by justices.
The daunting workload before both the
court and Congress suggests at the very
least that staffers do and will have a
significant role in both contexts.
Perhaps the real point here is that
instead of wringing hands over the
potential influence of staffers, we should
focus on the nature of the principal-agent
relationship in both the legislative and
adjudicative arenas. If legislators closely
monitor delegated drafting work, in all or
at least a recognizable subset of
circumstances, then the potential for
"freelancing" by staff - with or without
the input of lobbyists - should be
reduced. A similar point about monitoring
can be made in relation to Supreme Court
justices. Recasting the inquiry in this way
undermines the idea that the very fact that
staffers and interest groups are situated to
influence the production of legislative
history is, without more, a sufficient basis
for rejecting its use in statutory interpretation.
THE DISCIPLINARIAN CLAIM. The

existing literature on Congress does suggest
one significant problem with the
disciplinarian claim: that it suffers from an
exceedingly caricatured and court-centered
view of legislative history To skeptics like
Justice Scalia, legislative history materials
- especially committee reports - are
produced principally, if not exclusively, to
affect judicial interpretation. While that
goal can reasonably be assumed to be
among those that legislators have in mind
when committee reports are written, it is
far from obvious that it is the driving
factor. Indeed, many legislative scholars
take a different view of committee reports,
in particular, and see them as primarily
directed at a congressional audience, and as
intended to persuade other legislators to
support a bill based on the information
gathered and rationales formulated by the
committee responsible for the bill.
Turning more specifically to what the
opinions studied suggest on this point, the
data do cast some doubt on the basic idea

that eliminating legislative history will
require, or even encourage, Congress to
legislate with more textual precision and
clarity. The problem most clearly illustrated
by my study is that legislative history is
only one small part of a larger set of
nontextual sources. There are far too many
other interpretive resources used by the
court, in far too unpredictable a manner, to
sustain the notion that, by eliminating
legislative history, the court will be giving
Congress "a sure means by which it may
work the people's will." My study suggests
that in cases where no legislative history is
used, the justices still use nontextual
interpretive resources to help resolve
ambiguity, and they draw, in common law
style, on a broad range of such resources.
The profusion of nontextual interpretive
resources in the opinions studied also casts
doubt on a related dimension of the
disciplinarian claim: the notion that the
court's interpretive method should not only
make statutory meaning more predictable
to Congress, but also to lawyers, judges,
and citizens. Those who must abide by law,
the argument goes, should not be
burdened with an onerous and often
inconclusive trip through legislative history
But the terms opinions suggest that this
vision of laws ready accessibility is not
likely to be met, whether or not legislative
history is used. Ousting legislative history,
in short, will not deliver simplicity because
there are too many other routes to
uncertainty.

CONCLUSION

systematic study of the "is," with the result
that unhelpful abstractions and,
occasionally, caricatures, provide the basis
for normative analysis. Future study of the
actual - as opposed to assumed interpretive practices of the Supreme
Court, the lower federal courts, and the
state courts can significantly advance and
enrich the study of the role played by
courts in the larger lawmaking process.
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I have argued that the opinions studied
suggest rethinking the legislative history
question, the broader conceptual
framework surrounding statutory
interpretation, and the role of judges in
that enterprise. Equally important, perhaps,
my study also suggests the virtues of
empirically-oriented normative analysis in
probing questions like those explored here.
Too often, the approach of legal scholars to
the "ought" is insufficiently informed by a
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